
The discourse surrounding Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) has resurfaced heavily in recent podcasts, strategic interviews, and official foreign policy briefings. Why does India maintain silence? if it considers the territory inalienable, is it a strategic silence or there remains some deeper pragmatism that keeps it away from any concrete action in that direction.
As we deconstruct this paradox, and examine the foundations of New Delhi’s official posture, the geopolitical rationale behind its calculated restraint becomes apparent. Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) including Gilgit-Baltistan, is an inalienable part of the Indian Union. This claim is anchored in the 1947 Instrument of Accession (IoA) and reinforced by a unanimous 1994 parliamentary resolution. However, observers frequently point to a stark dissonance between this resolute legal claim and New Delhi’s operational response, which is often characterized by prolonged periods of “strategic silence” or a sort of diplomatic restraint. Far from representing an abdication of its claims, India’s measured approach is influenced by geopolitical strategy rooted in international law, risk mitigation, and a preference for letting Pakistan’s internal structural contradictions weaken its grip on the region.
India also avoids aggressive, revisionist rhetoric because it considers its legal title firmly established. From New Delhi’s perspective, Pakistan’s presence in PoJK constitutes an illegal military occupation rather than evidence of genuinely disputed sovereignty and therefore does not require constant rhetorical reaffirmation. This posture enables India to present itself to the international community as a responsible status-quo power that respects the principles of international order. Persistent threats of territorial reclamation or overtly confrontational language would undermine India’s broader diplomatic objective: projecting itself as a stable, predictable global bridge-builder and a responsible actor in the Indo-Pacific. Besides, any overt campaign to physically reclaim PoJK would carry the strategic complexity of a potential two-front confrontation involving Pakistan and China. This risk is heightened by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which passes directly through Gilgit-Baltistan and gives Beijing a material stake in the region’s stability. By maintaining strategic restraint, New Delhi preserves its freedom of action, avoids an avoidable escalation spiral, and retains the ability to choose the timing, scale, and form of any future response.
Furthermore, New Delhi recognizes that overt Indian intervention often serves as a unifying mechanism for Pakistan’s fractured political landscape. Historically, whenever India amplifies its rhetoric regarding Kashmir, the Pakistani military establishment utilizes the “external threat” narrative to legitimize its institutional dominance and suppress domestic dissent. By maintaining a lower rhetorical profile, India deprives Rawalpindi of an external scapegoat, forcing the Pakistani state to confront its own internal governance failures. Recent developments demonstrate that India’s silence is neither passive nor permanent; it is highly situational. The region has been gripped by massive, indigenous protests organized by groups like the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) over severe economic exploitation, administrative oppression, and inflation.
In response to these shifting realities, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has deliberately altered its tone. Breaking away from absolute silence, official statements have directly
blamed Islamabad’s “decades-long systemic exploitation and denial of fundamental rights” for the unrest. Rather than threatening military invasion, India has chosen a more sophisticated diplomatic track: calling on the international community to hold Pakistan accountable for human rights abuses and police brutality in the occupied zones. This pivot shows that India’s strategy is to let the local population’s alienation and do the heavy lifting, while New Delhi provides the necessary diplomatic echo chamber on the world stage.
India’s stand on PoJK is governed by a long-term strategic timeline rather than short-term political theatre. The silence is not a sign of weakness or a dilution of its core territorial claims; it is an exercise in strategic patience. By balancing its firm legal sovereignty with tactical restraint, India avoids costly military entanglements, preserves its image as a responsible global actor, and allows the internal economic and political contradictions within Pakistan to manifest naturally. India’s strategic patience is proving to be a highly effective instrument of foreign policy, one that waits for the fruit to ripen rather than shaking the tree prematurely. Yet strategic patience must not become strategic paralysis. If evolving conditions create a favourable diplomatic, political, and security environment, New Delhi must retain the resolve to act at the appropriate moment, guided not by impatience but by a sober assessment of timing, capability, and consequence. In that sense, restraint is not the absence of intent, but the discipline to strike the iron only when it is truly hot.
To understand how rapidly the geopolitical “fruit” can ripen, one can look back to the autumn of 1989. For decades, the division of Germany seemed unshakeable and Western powers maintained a policy of steady deterrence, never forcing a military confrontation over the Berlin Wall. But on the morning of 9 November 1989, East German officials during a routine press conference announced minor travel rule relaxations. When a reporter asked when the new regulations would take effect, an unprepared official checked his notes and mumbled, “Immediately, without delay.” Within hours, thousands of citizens flooded the checkpoints, the guards stepped aside, and the Berlin Wall fell by nightfall. What political analysts thought would take decades happened in a single evening because the internal pressures had quietly rotted the system from within, leaving it ready to collapse at the slightest nudge. Who knows, in case of PoJK it might happen tomorrow.
Dr. Sachidananda Panda
School of Liberal Arts,
XIM University, Bhubaneswar
